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1700
Abstract. We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It
assumes “local” rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient
of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents
deviation from rationality in the form of a “heat bath”. We focus on par-
ticular games of a large number of players with a global interaction which
is typical of economic systems. The stable states of this dynamics coincide
with the Nash equilibria of game theory. We study the gaussian fluctuations
around these equilibria and establish that fluctuations around competitive
equilibria increase with the number of players. In other words, competi-
tive equilibria are characterized by very broad and uneven distributions
among players. We also develop a small noise expansion which allows to
compute a “free energy” functional. In particular we discuss the problem
of equilibrium selection when more than one equilibrium state is present.
1. Introduction
The economic world is a complex many-body dynamical system whose fluc-
tuation phenomena has recently attracted much attention in the physicists
community [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. The identification, in economics and finance, of
phenomena (such as scaling and multiscaling) which also occur in physical
systems (such as critical phase transitions and turbulence) suggests that
some of the knowledge and techniques developed in physics to understand
fluctuation phenomena, might also be useful to understand fluctuations in
economics and finance.
Fluctuation phenomena in physics depend on the nature of the equilib-
rium state. The starting point to understand fluctuations in economics is
then a theory for economic equilibria. Game Theory[6] is the natural can-
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didate: it describes the interaction among players’ strategies and, assuming
rationality, it identifies the possible game equilibria, named after Nash[7].
It is important to stress at this point that we shall deal mainly with
economics and not with finance. Finance is, loosely speaking, a dynamical
system out of equilibrium, where players gamble (speculate) on future mar-
ket’s fluctuations (see ref. [5] for a model). In an economic system, instead,
the assumption of rational behavior is more realistic. However perfect ratio-
nality is utopistic in real life. Deviations from rationality, which can arise
from human errors, from limited or incomplete information or from ran-
dom events, are practically unavoidable. Put differently one can say that,
in real life, reducing human errors or the impact of random events costs
time and money. Infinite precision is impossible if not at infinite costs. The
analysis of the effects of “irrationality” becomes then an important issue to
understand how game theoretical predictions can be modified in realistic
situations.
We shall address this issue for a “thermodynamic” economic system:
a system with many degrees of freedom (players). The random events dis-
cussed above have then the same qualitative nature of thermal fluctuations
in statistical mechanics. One can indeed think that, in a thermodynamic
system, each degree of freedom pursues the minimization of the (global)
energy in the presence of random shocks due to thermal fluctuations. In
the same manner we shall assume that in a macro-economic system, each
agent pursues the maximization of his utility, under the effect of random
shocks. In this perspective, Nash equilibria become analogs of ground states
in statistical mechanics and deviations from rationality can be introduced
in exactly the same way as temperature is introduced in statistical me-
chanics. In particular, there are several dynamical ways, depending on the
nature of the problem, to model temperature in statistical mechanics. This
leads us to a natural definition of stochastic dynamics in game theory.
In this work, which is an extension of a previous paper [8], we shall
follow these lines, using the Langevin approach. We shall address the issue
of fluctuations around Nash equilibria and the effects of deviations from
rationality in some specific games with a large number n of players. We
shall focus on games where each of the n players can control a continuous
variable or “strategy” xi. He is endowed of a utility function ui which
depends on his strategy xi as well as on that of other players {xj , j 6= i}.
In the model, each player continuously adjusts his variable xi in order to
maximize his utility. He also faces stochastic shocks which affect his actions
and, as a result, the variable xi(t) becomes a continuous time stochastic
process. The stochastic force acting on a player is similar to that arising
from an “heat bath” at finite temperature in statistical mechanics. The
dynamics allows for a comparison with equilibrium dynamics in statistical
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Figure 1. Global interaction among players in a stock market.
mechanics, which we find a useful paradigm to discuss the results. In this
comparison negative utility plays the role of an energy and the effects of
fluctuations can be compared to entropic effects in statistical mechanics.
The main difference between the two dynamics is that, while in statistical
mechanics each degree of freedom evolve to minimize a global (free) energy,
in game theory each degree of freedom maximizes his own (part of the total)
utility.
We shall focus on a particular class of games with a global interaction.
By this we mean that the utility ui of each player depends on others’ players
strategies xj only through an aggregate or global quantity x¯, whose value is
determined by all of them. This peculiar interaction, shown schematically
in figure 1, reflects the nature of economic laws such as the law of demand
and supply.
Nash equilibria are stationary points of the dynamics. When we include
fluctuations we find that two main equilibria exist: i) non-competitive equi-
libria, where each player’s equilibrium strategy is determine by its interac-
tion with the rules of the game and ii) competitive equilibria, which result
from the the aggressive competition of each player with all the others. For
example, we shall discuss a game where the introduction of taxes determines
both a non-competitive and a competitive equilibria. In the former it will
be the balance between profit and loss due to taxes, which is important for
each player. In the other, competitive equilibrium, taxes are negligible and
the balance leading to equilibrium is only due to the competition among
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all players.
The main results that we shall find are:
1. Competitive Nash equilibria are usually affected by very large fluctua-
tions which increase with the number of players. Competition leads to
broad distributions and large inequalities in an economic system. This
is reminiscent of Pareto Law of distribution of incomes[9]. We shall
find that inequalities increase with the number of players.
2. Competitive equilibria are also characterized by large relaxation times
which are proportional to n, and by a negative correlation between
players’ strategies. This means that two players tend to have opposite
fluctuations around the Nash equilibrium.
3. At odd with statistical mechanics, where fluctuations always increase
the system’s energy, we shall find that in a game theoretical system,
under particular conditions, fluctuations increase the utility (i.e. de-
crease the “energy”).
4. We can, in principle, compute the stationary state distribution in strat-
egy space. This allows to solve, for example, the problem of equilibrium
selection in games where more than one Nash equilibrium exists.
5. Fluctuations, in general, displace Nash equilibria and in some cases,
for strong enough randomness, a Nash equilibrium can also disappear.
6. Our approach also suggests that time-scales for the transition from
one Nash equilibrium to another one are proportional to exp[−∆F/D],
where ∆F is a “free energy barrier” and D is the noise strength.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews game the-
ory and discusses some simple game. We also discuss briefly evolutionary
game theory and its differences with our approach. Section 4 introduces the
class of models we shall analyze. The following section discusses gaussian
fluctuations around Nash equilibria. Then we develop a general approach
to the stationary state probability distribution in strategy space. The main
results are illustrated with simple examples. In the final section we summa-
rize the results, we draw some conclusions and comment on possible further
extensions.
2. Game theory and evolution
An economic system consists of a large number of interacting agents. In the
game theoretical setting, each agent has a spectrum of strategies parametrized
by an index x. Each player i is also endowed of a utility or payoff function
ui which depends on the strategy xi he plays as well as on that played
by all other players. With the notation x−i = {xj , j 6= i}, we can conve-
niently write ui = ui(xi, x−i). xi are also called pure strategy as opposed
to mixed strategies µi(x), in which strategy x is played with probability
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µi(x) by player i. Under mixed strategies, the strategies used by the play-
ers are independent random variables. Independence is justified in one stage
games, which are played just once and each player has to decide his strategy
simultaneously, without information about what others will do.
Game theory, in its simplest setting, assumes that the payoff functions
are common knowledge and that each player behaves rationally. Rationality
is also common knowledge, which means that each player knows all other
players are rational (these are so-called complete information games). Game
theory aims at predicting the possible stable states of the system, which are
called Nash Equilibria [7]. The strategies x∗i are a Nash Equilibrium (NE)
if each player’s utility, for fixed opponents’ strategies x∗−i, is a maximum
for xi = x
∗
i , i.e. ui(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≥ ui(xi, x∗−i), ∀xi. The NE strategies x∗i are
such that no player has incentives to change his strategy, since any change
would cause a utility loss. Nash showed[7] that any game has at least one
Nash equilibrium in the space of mixed strategies.
2.1. THE COURNOT GAME AND THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
The concept of NE is best illustrated by a simple example, originally
introduced by Cournot in 1838 [10]: 2 firms produce quantities x1 and
x2 respectively, of a homogeneous product. The market-clearing price of
the product depends, through the law of demand-and-offer, on the total
quantity X = x1 + x2 produced: P (X) = a − bX. The larger X the
smaller P is. The model assumes that the cost of producing a quantity
xi is cxi and c < a. The firms choose their strategies (i.e. xi) with the
goal to maximize their profit. We can then define the payoff function as
ui = xi[P (x1 + x2) − c] = xi[a − c − b(x1 + x2)]. The problem is to find
xi assuming that both firms behave rationally. One way to do this is by
means of the concept of best response. The best response of a player i to
the opponents strategies x−i, is the strategy xi = x
∗
i (x−i) which maximizes
ui(xi, x−i). In the Cournot game, the best response x
∗
1(x2) of firm 1 to any
given strategy x2 of firm 2 is obtained by maximizing u1(x1, x2) with re-
spect to x1 with fixed x2, i.e. x
∗
1(x2) = (a− c− bx2)/(2b). Firm 2, knowing
that 1 behaves rationally (i.e. that it will play x∗1(x2) whatever x2 is) will
choose x∗2 which maximizes u2(x
∗
1(x2), x2). It is important to stress that
operationally this means
∂
∂x2
u2(x1, x2)
∣∣∣∣
x1=x∗1(x2)
= 0,
i.e. the maximum of u2 must be found at fixed x1. This leads to x
∗
1 =
x∗2 = (a − c)/3b. This simple example shows that rationality, and the as-
sumption of other’s rationality, plays a crucial role in the concept of Nash
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equilibrium[7]. It is easy to generalize this game to n firms. Let us set, for
convenience, a − c = 1 and b = 1/n. Then ui(xi, x−i) = xi(1 − x¯), where
x¯ = (x1 + . . . + xn)/n is the average of xi. The calculations generalizes
straightforwardly and we find [8] a NE at xi = x0 = n/(n + 1) and a per
player payoff ui = n/(n+1)
2. This celebrated example, is also known as the
Tragedy of the commons[11]. In this formulation of the problem, the utility
ui = xiV (X) depends on a common resource V (X) = c− P (X) which, at
the NE, is almost totally depleted by the aggressive behavior of players. As
a result each player receives a very small payoff. This is an example of a
competitive NE where the strategies of players are not limited because of
a direct loss in utility, but because the global resource is almost exhausted
by the aggressive, competitive behavior of players.
2.2. REPEATED GAMES AND EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY
This setting generalizes to repeated games, where different stage games are
played a finite or an infinite number of times. In repeated games a strategy
must describe the action the player has to do at each stage. Also the single
stage utility is generally replaced by an utility which accounts for many
stages, usually with a discount factor (i.e. an exponential weight function
for future utility). All these things make the analysis much more complex
than in single stage games.
A game posses, in general, several NE’s, and this raises the question of
which of them is more relevant. In order to answer this question, several
definitions of stability have been proposed [12, 13, 14]. The most successful
approach to stability has been that of evolutionary game theory[15, 12].
This considers a game with mixed strategies as a game played by a popu-
lation of players playing pure strategies with random opponents.
This idea has attracted much interests in the community of theoretical
population biologists, which have translated this idea into a mathematical
model: the so called replicator dynamics[16]. Though several versions of this
dynamics have been proposed [16, 12], in its simplest form, it assumes that
the individuals playing a given strategy reproduce at a rate proportional to
their utility. Stochastic fluctuations, in the population dynamical setting of
replicator dynamics, have also been considered in refs. [17].
There are some points that are worth to point out in evolutionary game
theory. The first is that its application has been mostly limited to two play-
ers games. Indeed its generalization to contexts with n players is technically
very complex[12]. The second is that rationality is not assumed. Players are
on the contrary rather dull: they just keep playing the game the way their
ancestors did. Rational NE results from the selective evolution of replica-
tor dynamics. Finally we note that replicator dynamics assumes that the
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strategies xi are independently chosen by each player
1. It also assumes that
xi(t) is independent of xi(t
′) for t′ 6= t.
In contrast with these observations, our goal is to study a simple realis-
tic dynamics for an n≫ 1 players game with “almost” rational players. We
shall do this weakening the assumption of perfect rationality with the intro-
duction of a “thermal” noise. Therefore xi(t) will become a continuous time
stochastic process. We shall therefore pursue quite different purposes and
use totally different techniques than those of evolutionary game dynamics.
3. The Langevin approach
Focusing on a class of models with a continuum spectrum of strategies xi,
we recently proposed [8] a Langevin dynamics of the form
∂txi = Γi
∂ui
∂xi
+ ηi . (1)
Where the stochastic term ηi(t) models deviation from perfect rationality.
We take ηi(t) gaussian with 〈ηi(t)〉 = 0 and
〈ηi(t)ηj(t′)〉 = 2∆i,jδ(t− t′). (2)
Eq. (1) is a model dynamics which contains both the deterministic ef-
forts each player exerts to increase his payoff and the effects of random
events. The deterministic part assumes “local rationality” of the agents:
each agent knows which is the direction in which his utility increases. In
other words, it assumes that each agent knows the utility function ui as a
function of xi in a small neighborhood of xi. Note that this weakens the
assumption of perfect rationality, according to which each player knows the
function ui for any xi and any xj , j = 1, . . . , n.
The stochastic term ηi, represents all hindrances which prevent a ratio-
nal behavior. These may be internal, i.e. affect only one player (e.g. illness),
or external if they affect equally all players (e.g. earthquake). This suggests
that ηi is composed of two components, ηi = η˜i + η˜0, where the η˜i’s are
independent gaussian forces. This motivates our choice
∆i,j = Diδi,j +D0 (3)
for the correlation of ηi. Here Di is the strength of the stochastic force η˜i
acting on player i, whereas D0 is that for events η˜0 which affect all players
in the same way.
1The joint distribution of the strategies factorizes into the single players distribution
functions µi(x, t).
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Clearly, since NE are defined as the set of xi for which the equations
∂
∂xi
ui(xi, x−i) = 0, (4)
are simultaneously satisfied, for ∆i,j = 0, NE are stationary points of the
dynamics. Equation (1) is also very appealing since, comparing eq. (1) with
model A dynamics[18], it allows for an analogy with statistical mechan-
ics. The main difference with statistical mechanics is that in game theory
each degree of freedom (player’s strategy) maximizes a different function
(player’s utility) whereas in statistical mechanics each degree of freedom
minimizes the same function (energy or Hamiltonian). Also, at odd with
statistical mechanics, the interactions among strategies need not be sym-
metric: players’ goals may be in conflict with one another.
In this analogy, NE are analogs of zero temperature (meta) stable states.
The Langevin approach includes “thermal” fluctuations in game theory, and
this allows to analyze stability of NE through the study of fluctuations. It
also gives a “free energy” measure, which enables to distinguish the real
“ground state” from “meta-stable” states. Indeed in an ideal slow cooling
down where ∆i,j → 0, analogous to simulated annealing, only the state with
the smallest “free energy” is selected independently of the initial conditions.
This contrasts with the evolutionary approach, where the final state is
uniquely determined by the initial conditions. The Fokker-Planck equation
associated to eq. (1) provides a description of the game at the level of the
distribution of xi. At odd with replicator dynamics (which also involves
the distribution functions of the xi), this does not assumes that the xi are
independent. As we shall see, correlations indeed arise.
4. The model
Many complex systems in economics have a very peculiar form of interaction
(see figure 1). In a stock market, for example, each agent guesses whether to
buy or to sell a stock, looking at the stock’s price fluctuations. These fluc-
tuations are in their turn produced by the cumulative effect of the actions
of all the agents in the market, through some form of demand-offer law [5].
Each player interacts with a signal, which in its turn is determined by the
collective effect of all players. A further example is the above mentioned
Cournot model, where n firms produce the same good, and the market
clearing price is determined by the ratio between the aggregate production
and the demand.
Focusing on this kind of interactions, we consider in the following situ-
ations where the payoff function for player i is
ui(xi, x−i) = −B(xi, x¯), x¯ = x1 + . . .+ xn
n
. (5)
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In other words, the payoff for player i depends on xj for j 6= i only through
the aggregate quantity nx¯. The n-players Cournot game, is of this form with
−B(x, y) = xV (y), and has been discussed at length in ref. [8].
Because of the symmetry of the interaction, the NE are symmetric:
x∗i = x
∗ for all i, and x∗ satisfies the equation
∂ui
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
xj=x∗
= −B1,0(x∗, x∗)− 1
n
B0,1(x
∗, x∗) = 0 (6)
where we defined, for convenience,
Bj,k(x, y) =
∂j
∂xj
∂k
∂yk
B(x, y), B0,0(x, y) = B(x, y).
A NE must not only be an extremum of ui, it must also be a maximum
with respect to xi at fixed opponents’ strategies x−i = x
∗. This requires
∂2ui
∂x2i
∣∣∣∣∣
xj=x∗
= −B2,0(x∗, x∗)− n+ 1
n2
B1,1(x
∗, x∗)− 1
n2
B0,2(x
∗, x∗) < 0. (7)
It is worth to emphasize that eq. (6,7) are necessary but not sufficient for
x∗ to be a NE. Indeed a NE must be globally stable, which means that
ui(xi, x−i = x
∗) must have a global minimum at xi = x
∗, ∀i.
5. Fluctuations around a Nash equilibrium
Let xi = x
∗ be a NE for our model. Without loss of generality we can set
x∗ = 0 by a linear transformation xi → xi−x∗. We shall also set B(0, 0) = 0.
We can then investigate the small gaussian fluctuations around the NE
resulting from the Langevin dynamics (1). Expanding the deterministic
part to leading order, we arrive at the equation
x˙i = −Γi
n∑
j=1
(
gδi,j +
h
n
)
xj + ηi (8)
where
g = B2,0(0, 0) +
1
n
B1,1(0, 0),
h = B1,1(0, 0) +
1
n
B0,2(0, 0).
Stability requires that all the eigenvalues of the matrixGi,j = Γi(gδi,j+h/n)
must be positive. These are given by the equation
1
h
=
1
n
n∑
k=1
Γk
λ− gΓk . (9)
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A graphic inspection of the solutions of these equations, shows that if
g > 0, h+ g > 0, (10)
then all eigenvalues are positive. Note that, in terms of g and h the local
stability condition (7) reads g + h/n > 0. For n ≥ 1 this is clearly satisfied
if the conditions (10) are met.
Equation (8) is a multivariate Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process [19]. Fluctu-
ations around the NE are described by the matrix σi,j = 〈xixj〉 of correla-
tions. This is the solution of the set of linear equations Gσ + σGT = 2∆,
where Gi,j = Γi(gδi,j + h/n) and ∆ is the matrix of the noise correla-
tion given in eq. (3)[19]. Introducing the vector vi =
∑
j σi,j , this matrix
equation can be reduced to
gσi,i +
h
n
vi =
Di +D0
Γi
(11)(
g + h
Γ
Γi + Γ
)
vi + h
Γiv
Γi + Γ
=
Di
Γi
+
2nD0
Γi + Γ
. (12)
Here we have introduced the notation f = 1n
∑
k fk for averages over the
ensemble of players. Note that vi = n〈xix¯〉 is the correlation between the
variable xi and the global variable x¯.
Qualitatively there are two different cases according to whether the
Γi are broadly distributed or not. We shall first focus on the second case,
when the average value of Γi is much larger than the fluctuations around it:
(Γ− Γ)2 ≪ Γ2. With a redefinition of the scale of B, we set, for simplicity,
Γ = 1. In the limit n → ∞ and ǫ =
√
(Γ− Γ)2 ≪ 1, the values of Γi are
densely distributed in a small interval of size ≈ ǫ. In each interval [Γ,Γ+dΓ),
dΓ≪ ǫ we can define an average value of Di, σi,i and vi, which we denote
by D(Γ), σ(Γ) and v(Γ). This allows for a systematic expansion in powers
of ǫ.
For ǫ = 0, one easily finds
v(1) = v =
D + nD0
g + h
,
σ(1) = σ =
(
1− h
n(g + h)
)
D
g
+
D0
g + h
(13)
Note that v(1) > 0, which means that each variable xi tends to fluctuate in
phase with x¯. We can also compute an ensemble average of the correlation,
which for ǫ = 0 reads
C =
1
n(n− 1)
∑
i 6=j
〈xixj〉 = v − σ
n− 1 =
D0
g + h
− hD
ng(g + h)
. (14)
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The common stochastic force, as it could be expected, gives a positive
contribution to the correlation, and for D0 large enough, the correlation
always turns positive.
With respect to the dynamics in the stationary state, correlation func-
tions decay exponentially
〈xi(t+ t0)xj(t0)〉 − σi,j ∝ e−t/τ .
The correlation time τ of the leading exponential behavior is given by the
minimum eigenvalue τ = maxk(λ
−1
k ) in eq. (9).
It is finally possible to compute the average utility
〈u〉 = −1
2
σB2,0 − v
n
B1,1 − v
2n
B0,2 (15)
where all derivatives of B are evaluated at (0, 0). Note that in view of our
choice B(0, 0) = 0 this expression yields the deviation of the average utility
from a completely rational behavior. As we shall see it is possible that
fluctuations increase the average utility. The last term in eq. (15) is the
average of the utility at the Nash equilibrium in presence of fluctuations:
〈ui(0, x−i)〉 = − v
2n
B0,2.
This would be the utility of a player which maintains the NE strategy
xi = 0 even in presence of fluctuations. It is interesting to note that it
is possible that 〈u〉 > 〈ui(0, x−i)〉. Loosely speaking this means that in a
game with random deviations from rationality players who are affected by
the randomness may receive a higher payoff (on average) than those which
behave rationally (xi = 0). The condition for this to happen is
1
2
σB2,0 +
v
n
B1,1 < 0 . (16)
Let us now discuss these findings. As expected the fluctuations of xi
grow withDi andD0. There are three qualitatively different cases, as shown
in figure 2:
a) when B2,0, B1,1 and B2,0 are all finite and positive. The point (g, h)
lies well inside the domain defined by eq. (10). As a result we have
a normal behavior with small fluctuation. Fluctuations increase the
average utility and a rational behavior is generally more rewarding.
b) B2,0 ≃ 0, B1,1 and B2,0 are finite and positive. Then g ∼ 1/n is small
and, from eq. (13), we see that fluctuations are proportional to n.
This, in view of the explicit factor g in front of σi,i in eq. (11), is a gen-
eral feature which holds also for broadly distributed Γi. The condition
12 MATTEO MARSILI AND YI-CHENG ZHANG
y
x
a)
y
x
b)
y
x
c)
Figure 2. Quadratic approximation of the utility function close to a Nash equilibrium.
a) B2,0, B1,1 and B2,0 are finite and positive; b) B2,0 ≃ 0, B1,1 > 0 and B2,0 > 0; c)
B2,0 +B1,1 ≃ 0.
B2,0 ≃ 0 obtains for example for utilities of the form B(x, y) = −xb(y),
which describes e.g. the tragedy of the commons problem[11, 8]. We
shall discuss in more detail this class of models in the next paragraph.
Generally B2,0 = 0 is typical of competitive equilibria. Indeed it means
that each player does not feel the effects of a change in his xi directly.
Rather it feels it indirectly through the reaction of other players, or
better through the effects this change has on the global variable x¯.
Large fluctuations are a result of the fact that the dependence of x¯ on
xi is weak. Competitive equilibria are also characterized by negatively
correlated variables xi for D0 small enough: C < 0. Large fluctuations
come together with large relaxation times. Indeed eigenvalues are pro-
portional to g, so that for g ≪ 1 all of them are small, yielding large
relaxation times τ ∼ n. Finally the average utility is decreased.
c) B2,0+B1,1 ≃ 0. Also in this case large fluctuations occur since g+h ≃ 0.
The divergence of the terms proportional to D0 suggests that the mode
with stronger fluctuations is associated with x¯. For h + g small the
smallest eigenvalue is small. This results in a large correlation time
τ = Γ−1/(g + h) +O(1). At odd with the case b), only one eigenvalue
is small in this case, the others being O(1). The (right) eigenvector
associated with this eigenvalue is wi = 1 + O(g + h) nearly constant.
The slow mode characterized by large fluctuations is then associated
with x¯. Note that also C ∼ (g + h)−1 is large and positive, which
means that xi fluctuate in phase thus yielding a large fluctuation of
their sum. Finally fluctuations may decrease the average utility in this
case. Furthermore if player i behaves rationally (xi = 0) he receives a
smaller payoff 〈u〉 > 〈ui(0, x−i)〉.
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These results can be extended to higher order in ǫ. The idea is to as-
sume that Γi are distributed around 1 according to a gaussian density with
standard deviation ǫ. We shall limit our discussion to the first term here.
Taking the average of eq. (12), multiplied by Γi − 1 over this distribution
and taking the leading order in ǫ, gives
v′(1) = −D(1)
g + h
+
2D′(1)
2g + h
− gnD0
(g + h)(2g + h)
σ′(1) =
D′(1)−D(1)−D0
g
− h
gn
v′(1) .
These equations give interesting informations. For example σ′(1) < 0 im-
plies that the fluctuations experienced by a player are smaller the faster his
dynamics (i.e. the larger his rate constant Γ). This is what one naturally ex-
pects and it occurs whenD′(1) < D(1)+D0[1−gh/(g+h)(2g+h)]+O(1/n).
On the other hand, if D(Γ) grows sufficiently fast with Γ, one has σ′(1) > 0.
This suggests that generally the fluctuations of a variable xi grow with Di
and decrease with Γi. The same kind of information can be obtained for
the correlation C. The case D0 = 0 yields a compact expression:
C ′
C
= −1 + g + h
2g + h
D′
D
.
This says that correlations are weaker for faster variables, unless D(Γ)
grows fast enough with Γ. We shall not discuss the case D0 > 0, which
leads to less transparent formulas.
The case of broadly distributed Γi needs a more detailed knowledge of
the parameters. However we expect that the results obtained by the small
disorder expansion above qualitatively describe the system. Note that eq.
(11) suggests that 〈x2i 〉 ∝ Di/Γi diverges as Γi → 0. In a large system
of players with broadly distributed Γi, the smallest Γi can be vanishingly
small as n → ∞. For example, in a system where the Γi are distributed
with a density ρ(Γ) ∼ Γβ−1 for Γ ≪ 1, one expects that the smallest Γi,
in the population of players, is Γmin ∼ n−1/β. In this case some player can
have fluctuations growing with n. It is worth to stress, however that such
a distribution of Γi implies a power law distribution of characteristic times
1/Γi, which might not be realistic.
5.1. AN EXAMPLE
Let us illustrate these findings with simple examples. An example with an
utility of the form B(x, y) = xy has been discussed in detail elsewhere [8].
The main point raised by this example is that of the emergence of large
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fluctuations. Here we shall describe a second example:
B(x, y|ρ) = b
2
(x− ρy)2.
The utility function ui(xi, x−i) = −B(xi, x¯|ρ) above describes a classical
game where each player has to throw a number xi with the aim of guessing
a fraction ρ of the average x¯ of all players’ guesses. This clearly has only
one NE xi = 0, ∀i. B(x, y|ρ) can also be assumed as a local approximation
of a more complex utility around one of its Nash equilibria.
With the choice b = (1−ρ/n)−1, the parameters are g = 1 and h = −ρ.
The stability condition requires that ρ < 1, which is intuitive because if
players where told to guess a number larger than the mean everybody
would tend to overshoot and xi → ∞. On the contrary with ρ < 1 every
player has to be careful: he must play a number which is smaller than the
one played by the others. In the extreme case ρ < 0 he has to try to do
the opposite of what the majority does. Let us discuss only the results for
ǫ = 0. It is straightforward to find
σ = D
(
1 +
ρ
n(1− ρ)
)
+
D0
1− ρ
C =
ρD
n(1− ρ) +
D0
1− ρ
Note that, for D0 = 0, C has the same sign of ρ. For ρ > 0, a player
attempts to guess the fluctuation of others and as a result it tends to make
fluctuations in the same direction as the others. On the other hand, for
ρ < 0 a negative correlation arises.
The average utility is 〈u〉 = −12D− n2 1−ρn−ρD0 whereas the condition (16),
after some algebra, reads:
[n− (n+ 1)ρ]D + (1− 2ρ)D0 < 0 .
In order for this condition to hold at least one of the two terms must be
negative. For 12 < ρ <
n
n+1 , it becomes “favorable” to follow the random
force for
D0 ≥ n− (n+ 1)ρ
n(2ρ− 1) D .
In other words, if the global component of the stochastic force is strong
enough, it is not convenient to play the NE strategy xi = 0.
This behavior can be qualitatively explained as follows: Each player has
to try to follow as closely as possible the global variable ρx¯. The latter
evolves under a stochastic force η¯ of strength D/n+D0 ≃ D0. The random
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force ηi acting on each player has a component of strength D0 along ρx¯.
If this component is large enough, each player can guess correctly whether
the mean x¯ will move left or right and so it becomes favorable to follow the
stochastic force.
For ρ > nn+1 the condition holds ∀D > 0 with D0 = 0. This region is
also characterized by large correlated fluctuations (note that g+h = 1−ρ ∼
1/n). Even in the absence of a global stochastic force, the dynamics leads
to a state where the xi are highly correlated. In such a state, the strategy
xi = 0 is less rewarding than the average.
For ρ < 12 there are no values of D and D0 for which the condition (16)
is satisfied.
6. Probability distribution in strategy space
In this section we shall extend the analysis of our model to study the full
probability distribution in the stationary state. A complete treatment is
not possible in general. We shall restrict attention to the case
Γi = 1, Di = D .
In view of our discussion of the previous section, Γi = 1 means that all
players have the same characteristic time-scale. Qualitatively, we expect
that the results below apply also in case of narrowly distributed time-scales.
Our equation is
x˙i = −B1,0(xi, x¯)− 1
n
B0,1(xi, x¯) + ηi. (17)
It is useful to introduce the variables
yk =
1√
k(k + 1)
k∑
i=1
(xi − xk+1), k < n (18)
yn =
x1 + . . . + xn√
n
=
√
nx¯. (19)
The transformation ~x→ ~y is orthonormal, which implies the useful identity
n∑
i=1
x2i =
n∑
k=1
y2k. (20)
The same transformation, applied to the noise term ~η → ~ζ leads to a
stochastic force ζk in the equation for y˙k which has a correlation
〈ζj(t)ζk(t′)〉 = 2δj,k(D + nD0δk,n) (21)
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which is diagonal. The common stochastic force D0 acts on yn only. For
convenience, instead of yn, we shall use the variable x¯ = yn/
√
n. The noise
η¯ appearing in the equation for ˙¯x has a strength T = D/n+D0.
6.1. LINEAR UTILITY
Let us first consider the model
B(x, z) = xb(z),
which allows for a full solution for the stationary state distribution of xi.
A situation described by this kind of utility function [11, 8] is a system
where n firms produce a quantity xi of a homogeneous product. Then −b
is the difference between the market clearing price of one unit of product
and the production cost of one unit. We assume that it depends only on
the aggregate production
∑
i xi = nx¯ (the production cost per unit is a
constant). The payoff ui = −xib of firm i is then proportional to its pro-
duction. In realistic situations b(x) is an increasing function. One expects
e.g. that because of competition, the price −b of a product decreases with
the total quantity produced, in view of the law of demand and offer.
The NE xi = x
∗ is defined by b(x∗) = −x∗b′(x∗)/n. Note that the payoff
per player
ui = −x∗b(x∗) = x
∗2b′(x∗)
n
is positive and proportional to 1/n.
The orthonormal transformation ~x→ ~y, yields
y˙k = −b
′(x¯)
n
yk + ζk, k < n (22)
˙¯x = −b(x¯)− b
′(x¯)
n
x¯+ η¯. (23)
The equation for x¯ does not involve other variables and can be directly
solved yielding the distribution pn(x¯). The equations for yk depend only on
x¯. Treating x¯ as a parameter, one can find the conditional distribution of
yk: p(yk|x¯). The full distribution is then
p(y1, . . . , yn) = pn(x¯)
n−1∏
k=1
p(yk|x¯).
Back transforming to the variables xi, yields the solution. Eq. (23) describes
a “particle” in a potential with thermal fluctuations and can be solved using
standard techniques[19]:
pn(x¯) = N exp
{
− x¯b(x¯) + (n− 1)
∫ x¯
0 dzb(z)
D + nD0
}
(24)
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with N a normalization factor. The equation for yk similarly gives
p(yk|x¯) =
√
b′(x¯)
πn
exp
{
−b
′(x¯)y2k
nD
}
(25)
where here normalization requires b′(x¯) > 0. Using the equation (20), one
can easily find the full distribution of xi:
p(x1, . . . , xn) ∝
[
b′(x¯)
πnD
]n−1
2
exp
{
−b
′(x¯)
nD
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)2
− x¯b(x¯) + (n− 1)
∫ x¯
0 dzb(z)
D + nD0
}
where x¯ = (x1 + · · ·+ xn)/n.
Some implications of this result have already been discussed in ref. [8].
In particular it was observed that if b′(x) ∼ O(1) one finds fluctuations of
order 〈x2i 〉 ∝ nD and large relaxation times τ ∼ n. We note furthermore
that p(x1, . . . , xn) vanishes as b(x¯)→ 0+. For b′(x¯) < 0, which corresponds
in any case to an “unphysical” situation2, we must set p(x1, . . . , xn) = 0.
Note that eqs. (22, 23) imply that if the system is “prepared” at t = 0 in a
state with b(x¯) < 0, in the early stages of the dynamics, the deviations xi−x¯
increase exponentially. This is clearly a highly non-equilibrium situation.
The average utility, to order D + nD0 is given by
〈ui〉 ≃ −x∗b(x∗)− [2b
′(x∗) + x∗b′′(x∗)](D + nD0)
2[(n + 1)b′(x∗) + x∗b′′(x∗)]
. (26)
If ∂
2
∂x2 [xb(x)]x=x∗ < 0, then the effect of fluctuation will be that of increasing
the average utility (note that, in the notations of the previous section,
(n+1)b′(x∗)+x∗b′′(x∗) = n(g+h) > 0). An example, which allows for simple
expressions, is b(x) = −1+x− 12ax2. Since b′(x) = 1−ax we need to restrict
the range of x to x < 1/a in order for b′(x) > 0 (otherwise x¯ would flow to
∞). The NE is at x∗ = n+1a(n+2)
(
1−
√
1− 2a+ 2a
(n+1)2
)
≃ 1a(1 −
√
1− 2a)
and its existence requires a ≤ 1/2. The payoff per player at the NE, to
leading order in n, is −x∗b(x∗) ≃ 1
na2
(1−√1− 2a)2√1− 2a. With gaussian
fluctuations, we find:
〈ui〉 ≃ −x∗b(x∗)
[
1− a
2(3
√
1− 2a− 1)(D + nD0)
2(1 − 2a)(1 −√1− 2a)2
]
.
2For example, in the firms problem, b′(x¯) < 0 means that the price increases if the
production is increased.
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For a ≥ 4/9 fluctuations increase the average utility, an effect related to
the asymmetry of the function b(x) around x∗.
The average 〈x¯〉 instead, has no corrections to order D. As we shall see
this does not hold in general. It does neither hold when the function b(x)
changes rapidly close to the NE, a situation which cannot be described in
the gaussian approximation. Consider for example, the game of the tragedy
of the commons, where the utility function is much steeper when negative
payoff arise: b(x) = x−1 for x < 1 and b(x) = q(x−1) for x > 1 and q ≫ 1.
This represents a situation where each player is very scared of receiving
negative payoffs. Clearly, as far as the NE is concerned, no change occurs:
The NE x∗ = n/(n+1) is always the same, dangerously close to the edge of
negative utilities. In the presence of fluctuations, however, the distribution
of x¯ is very asymmetric on the two sides of the NE. For x¯ > x∗ it drops
off much more quickly than for x¯ < x∗. As a result the NE is shifted by an
amount of order
√
D/n towards safer values of x¯ < x∗. We see then that
fluctuations can induce a more cautious behavior.
The most general model which allows for a complete solution, with the
above technique, is with B(x, z) = B0(z) + xb(z) + cx
2. The term B0(z)
changes only the distribution of x¯ by a factor proportional to exp[−B0(x¯)/n],
whereas the term cx2 also affects the distribution of xi. A simple realization
of this model, with c = 0, is the one where players cooperate to increase
each other’s utility: B0(z) = βzb(z) (β > 0). Of course β < 0 means
anti-cooperation, i.e. each player tries to maximize his utility as well as to
minimize that of others. With b(z) = z − 1, one easily finds that the NE is
at x∗ = n+βn+2β+1 and the payoff per player is u
∗
i =
(n+β)(1+β)
(n+2β+1)2 . A high degree
of cooperation, β ∝ n leads to a finite utility per player. On the contrary
fluctuations always remain large 〈δx2i 〉 ∼ nD. For β → ∞, as discussed
in [8], fluctuations diverge even though the average utility remains finite.
Clearly anti-cooperation β < 0 decreases the utility. However for β < −1
fluctuations give a positive contribution to the utility. Fluctuations increase
the average utility in over-competitive systems (those in which each player
main efforts are devoted to decrease other players’ payoffs).
6.2. THE GENERAL CASE
The general case does not allow for a full solution. It is however possible to
compute the stationary state distribution to leading order in D. We assume
that
yk ∼ xi − x¯ ∼ O(
√
D). (27)
While this is surely satisfied close to a NE (when all xi are close to x
∗), it
might not hold in non-equilibrium situations or when rare events such as
large fluctuations occur.
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The equation for y˙k, derived from eq. (17), contains terms Bj,k(xi, x¯)−
Bj,k(xk+1, x¯) with (j, k) = (1, 0) or (0, 1). Expanding in powers of xi − x¯
and xk+1 − x¯, we find, to leading order
y˙k = −
[
B2,0(x¯, x¯) +
1
n
B1,1(x¯, x¯)
]
yk + ζk
where ζk is still gaussian uncorrelated noise, in view of the orthonormality
of the transformation ~x → ~y (see eq. 21). This equation is valid to O(D),
since we neglected terms proportional to (xi − x¯)2 which are of order D in
view of eq. (27). Using eq. (21), one easily finds:
〈y2k|x¯〉 =
nD
nB2,0(x¯, x¯) +B1,1(x¯, x¯)
(28)
where we used the notation 〈y|x〉 for the average of the quantity y condi-
tional to the value x assumed by a second variable. Note that the require-
ment 〈y2k|x¯〉 ≥ 0, implies nB2,0(x¯, x¯)+B1,1(x¯, x¯) ≥ 0. This condition, which
generalizes the condition b′(x¯) ≥ 0 in the previous paragraph, restricts the
range of possible values of x¯.
Let us now move to the equation for x¯. Expanding the right hand side
of the equation for xi to second order in xi − x¯, we find
˙¯x = − B1,0(x¯, x¯)− 1
n
B0,1(x¯, x¯)
− 1
2
[
B3,0(x¯, x¯) +
1
n
B2,1(x¯, x¯)
]
1
n
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)2 + . . .+ η¯
where 〈η¯(t)η¯(t′)〉 = 2(D/n + D0)δ(t − t′). In view of eq. (20), we have∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2 =
∑n−1
k=1 y
2
k. Taking the average over yk conditional to the
value of x¯ in this equation, we substitute 1n
∑
i(xi − x¯)2 with n−1n 〈y2k|x¯〉.
This results in the equation
˙¯x = −B1,0 − 1
n
B0,1 − (n− 1)D
2n
nB3,0 +B2,1
nB2,0 +B1,1
+ η¯
where we suppressed the dependence on (x¯, x¯) of Bk,l.
The steady state distribution of x¯ is then given by P (x¯) ∝ exp[−F (x¯)/T ],
where the “temperature” is T = D/n+D0, and the “free energy” is given
by:
F (x) =
∫ x [
B1,0 +
1
n
B0,1 +
(n− 1)D
4n
nB3,0 +B2,1
nB2,0 +B1,1
]
(29)
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It is useful, for the following discussion, to split F = U − DS into a D
independent part and into a D dependent one:
U(x) =
∫ x [
B1,0(y, y) +
1
n
B0,1(y, y)
]
dy
and
S(x) = −n− 1
2n
∫ x
dy
nB3,0(y, y) +B2,1(y, y)
nB2,0(y, y) +B1,1(y, y)
The relation F = U − DS is reminiscent of a free energy in equilibrium
statistical mechanics, which is a useful paradigm to discuss our system.
6.3. DISCUSSION AND APPLICATIONS
It is worth to stress that the function U(x) is not simply related to the util-
ity. This contrast with equilibrium statistical mechanics where the proba-
bility of a state is directly related to his energy.
The “entropic” term S(x) results from the inclusion of the fluctuations
of the variables yk. Usually, in statistical mechanics, one finds that the
larger the fluctuations in a state the larger the entropy is. We shall see in
the following that this does not hold for our system: S can be larger for
“ordered” states than for states with wild fluctuations.
Fluctuations displace the NE (defined as the minima of F (x)) of a quan-
tity of order D:
x∗(D) = x∗(0)− (n− 1)D(nB3,0 +B2,1)
2n2(nB2,0 +B1,1)[nB2,0 + (n+ 1)B1,1 +B2,0]
.
Note that stability requires that the denominator be positive.
The analysis of any particular case goes as follows. First one needs to
determine the range of x¯ where our approach can be applied. This is given
by the condition nB2,0(x¯, x¯)+B1,1(x¯, x¯) > 0 which ensures that 〈y2k|x¯〉 > 0 is
finite. Outside this range, the behavior cannot be described perturbatively
in D (i.e. the gaussian approximation for the variables yk is no longer
valid). Secondly find all solutions of eq. (6), nB1,0+B0,1 = 0, which are the
candidates for NE’s. Each solution to this equation must then be checked
for stability. If eqs. (10) are verified, the equilibrium is stable. Finally for
each stable equilibrium one can evaluate its free energy F (x∗) from eq. (29).
This gives the statistical weight of each state in the stationary regime. The
state with the smallest F (x∗) is the one with a larger statistical weight and
it dominates in the limit T = D/n+D0 → 0.
In ref. [8] we discussed the case
B(x, y) = −x(1− y)
[
1− x(1− y)
2c
]
, c > 0 (30)
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n=100, c=0.1
D
x
F
Figure 3. F (x), as a function of D for the quadratic utility function: n = 100 and
c = 0.1.
of a quadratic utility both in x and y. This is an interesting case, both be-
cause such an utility function can be motivated [8] and because the system
possesses two NE’s. As a rough motivation, we can go back to the firms
problem with b(y) = −1+y, and argue that their utility ui may not exactly
equal their net gain xi(1− x¯) since this is then subject to taxes. If taxes do
not grow linearly with the income (as is usually the case) we need to add
a further term to the utility. The simplest choice leads to the above form
of B(x, y).
Let us go through the above passages for this example: Eq. (6) has one
only solution for c > 1/4 which is at
x0 =
n
n+ 1
, (31)
which is stable ∀c > 0. For c < 1/4 two other solutions appear at
x± =
1±√1− 4c
2
(32)
of which only x− is stable. These two NE’s have a quite different nature.
The NE at x0 is a competitive NE since B2,0 ≪ 1 and it is characterized by
a small payoff per player ui ∼ 1/n and by large fluctuations 〈δx2i 〉 ∼ n/D.
The NE at x− is Pareto dominant
3 since it has a finite and positive utility.
Also fluctuations are finite, as n → ∞, at x−. At this NE the action of
players is limited by the increase of the non-linear term due to “taxes”.
3The NE with largest utility is called Pareto dominant equilibrium in game theory.
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The function F (x) is readily computed. Setting, for convenience F (x+) =
0, we find
F (x−) = −(1− 4c)
3/2
6c
+
(1− 4c)3/2
6c
1
n
−log
[
1− 2c−√1− 4c
1− 2c+√1− 4c
]
D
n
+O(n−2)
and
F (x0) =
1− 6c+ 6c2 − (1− 4c)3/2
12c
− 1− 6c− 6c
2 − (1− 4c)3/2
12c
1
n
+
− log
[
n
1− 2c−√1− 4c
2c
]
D
n
+O(n−2).
The function F (x) is plotted in figure 3 for c = 0.1 as a function of D.
The “entropic” contribution, S(x) is of order 1/n. This is a consequence of
the fact that B3,0 = 0 in this model. Since B2,1(y, y) = −2(1 − y)/c < 0,
fluctuations in yk increase the probability of the state x0. Indeed for large
enough D, figure 3 shows that the state at x0 has a higher probability.
Therefore fluctuations in this case decrease the probability of the Pareto
dominant NE. Note also that, as D → 0 and n → ∞, F (x0) < F (x−) for
c > 2/9 = 0.2222 . . ., which implies that the probability to find the system
in the Pareto dominant NE x− tends to 0. This example shows that the
system does not always choose the state of maximum utility. In addition,
when D > 0 one stable state can become unstable. In our example, for
higher values of D or c the state at x− which is a minimum of U(x) is no
more a minimum of F (x).
In this system, however, entropic effects are “accidentally” small because
B3,0 = 0. If one adds a higher order term the situation changes. Consider
indeed
B(x, y) = −x(1−y)
[
1− 1− bc
3
2c
x(1− y)− b
4
x3(1− y)3
]
, c > 0 . (33)
For 0 < b < 4
c3
this has the same stable equilibria as before4. The picture,
in the limit n→∞, is qualitatively the same apart from the entropy, which
now is finite since B3,0(x, x) = 6bx(1 − x)4 6= 0. Note that B2,1 < 0, and
B3,0 > 0. Therefore the effects of fluctuations are opposite to the ones
discussed above. Indeed S(x0) < S(x−), which means that the stochastic
force favours, in this case, the Pareto dominant NE x− over the state x0.
Contrary to our intuition from statistical mechanics, it is the “ordered”
4For b < 0 the system is unstable and for b > 4c−3, x− becomes unstable and two
new equilibria appear.
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Figure 4. F (x), as a function of D for the utility function (33): n = 100, c = 0.25 and
b = 0.1.
state x− which has a larger contribution from the stochastic term. This is
shown in figure 4, which shows in particular that fluctuations lead to a new
minimum of F (x): This meta-stable state is a precursor of the NE at x−.
This example shows that the identification of S(x) with an entropy can be
misleading.
Direct numerical simulations of the Langevin equation gives results in
good agreement with this picture for small values of D. The higher order
terms in the D expansion seem to enhance the behavior discussed above
for the two particular models.
For a particle in a random potential F (x¯) subject to a stochastic force
of strength T = D/n+D0, the transition times from one metastable state
to the other are of the order of τ ≈ exp{n[F (xi) − F (x+)]/(D + nD0)}
where i = 0, − labels the state of departure. The generalization of this
result to our case, predicts relaxation times that, for D0 = 0 diverge in the
“thermodynamic” limit n→∞. This behavior is reminiscent of a first order
phase transition in statistical mechanics. It is worth to remind, however,
that the transition from one state to the other is a far from equilibrium pro-
cess, whereas we derived eq. (29) within an approximation which is valid to
order D close to the equilibria (see eq. 27). For this reason we performed
numerical simulations of the above bi-stable systems. Even though a sys-
tematic quantitative computation of transition times was too demanding,
we definitely found that numerical simulations are in qualitative agreement
with the picture emerging from the O(D) approximation.
7. Conclusions
We have introduced a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. This
assumes “local” rationality since any player tries to climb the gradient of
his utility function. This deterministic process is affected by a stochastic
force which represents deviation from rationality in the form of a “heat
bath”. We focused on particular games with a global interaction which
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is typical of socio-economic systems: each player’s utility depends on his
strategy as well as on a global quantity. The stable states of this dynamics
coincide with the NE. We studied the gaussian fluctuations around these
NE and established that competitive equilibria are characterized by large
fluctuations which grow with the number of players. Large fluctuations
imply great inequalities in the distribution of utility among players. Uneven
distribution of goods is, unfortunately, very common in the economic world.
Our analysis suggests that this is related to the competitive nature of the
Nash equilibrium. Players competing for a common resource have broadly
distributed utilities whereas players whose strategy is bounded by a direct
utility loss (as in the tragedy of commons with taxes) have more or less the
same payoffs. Fluctuations usually decrease the utility of players, but cases
where the contrary holds are also possible. Finally we studied the general
case in a small noise limit. We found that, depending on the particular,
game, fluctuations can either increase or decrease the dominance of a Pareto
dominant state and that new metastable states can occur.
This approach can naturally be extended to games with a discrete
strategy space. For these, the Langevin dynamics can be replaced by e.g.
Metropolis dynamics where each player tries to minimize his own cost func-
tion.
Fluctuations and deviation from rationality are inevitable in the real
world. Reducing their strength Di costs time and money. This suggests a
generalization of our work where Di is considered as a parameter in the
strategy space. If one then assumes that players have “local” rationality so
that the best thing they can do is to climb their utility gradient, one is left
with a system where the strategy of each player consists in the choice of
the strength of the fluctuations Di and the rate Γi at which they climb the
potential. In terms of these parameters ( ~D, ~Γ) we can define a generalized
utility function
Ui( ~D, ~Γ) = 〈ui(xi, x−i)| ~D, ~Γ〉+ U0(Di,Γi) , (34)
where the first term is the average utility discussed in the body of the
paper. The second term is instead related to the cost of achieving a noise
reduction to strength Di and a rate of convergence Γi. In general we expect
U0 to be a decreasing function of Di. Furthermore infinite precision Di = 0
most likely requires an infinite cost. A possible candidate for −U0 is the
entropy U0(D) ∝ 〈log P (η)〉 = log
√
D + C. In general we found that the
average utility decreases with increasing D. In these cases Nash equilibria,
in the strategy space ( ~D, ~Γ) will occur for Di > 0. In the particular cases
where we found that 〈ui(xi, x−i)〉 increases with Di, a large noise strength
will be preferred to a more rational behavior. This new approach would
provide a more realistic description of real systems of interacting players.
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